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ABSTRACT 
Karelia is a forestry-rich region on Russia’s Northwestern frontier. This article shows 
how institutional arrangements for local government were a product of contending efforts 
of Western donors and other transnational actors, the federal and regional governments, 
as well as municipalities. Russia’s federal recentralizing reforms and broader 
authoritarian context notwithstanding, Karelia illustrates how the choice of local 
institutions, as well as ideas about representation and citizenship are increasingly shaped 
by actors beyond the central state. Borrowing insights from Joel Migdal and Jesse Ribot, 
it argues that the result is shifting cognitive boundaries and ‘fragmented belonging’ 
(Ribot 2007) or multiple reference points of local citizens in a dynamic process of 
contestation and re-contestation of citizenship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Karelia is a forest-rich region on Russia’s border with Finland. In the 1990s, Western 
donors were successful in influencing the institutional arrangements of local government 
in Karelia. They stressed the importance of downwardly accountable institutions, 
cooperation between civil society organizations, municipalities, and the broader public, 
and social cohesion. The federal government by contrast, in 2003 embarked on 
recentralization, curbing local government independence and reducing its financial 
power. In the forestry sector, it has sought to eliminate even the limited powers of local 
governments in resource management. These reforms and Russia’s broader authoritarian 
context notwithstanding, Karelia illustrates how local institutions and ideas about 
representation and citizenship are outcomes of a dynamic process in which actors beyond 
the central state play a prominent role.  
 
Over the past two decades, dozens of countries worldwide have embraced 
decentralization as an institutional form that would promote efficiency, equity, and 
democracy. The logic behind these efforts is that if the right mix of institutions is in 
place, ‘genuine’ decentralization could solve many of the problems that local 
communities face in newly democratizing and developing contexts. As Ribot (2004) 
poignantly observes, however, getting to the if has proven to be a challenge, with many 
an ostensibly decentralized community still ‘waiting for democracy’. Indeed, few 
countries boast the mix of institutions that arguably makes for ‘genuine’ 
decentralization—democratically elected local authorities with their own tax and revenue 
base and legal guarantees for decision making on locally specific issues. 
 
Approximating the ‘if’ scenario, however, has likewise proved no panacea against the 
deeply embedded patterns of social exclusion, corruption, or inequity plaguing many a 
local community (Crook and Manor, 1998; Lankina, 2004). Regular democratic elections 
do not always make the mayors or councilors more accountable to local needs; and 
increasing the localities’ revenue base sometimes serves to transpose the corruption 
‘pathologies’ of the center to the local level (Carothers, 1999). Democratic local 
government institutions might be there, but they too often fail to translate into local 
representation, equity, and empowerment.  
 
These facts have been a source of frustration for decentralization advocates. 
Compounding these frustrations is a failure to locate decentralization in the broader 
contemporary contexts. Democratic decentralization is meant to strengthen citizenship 
and ‘belonging’ (Ribot, 2007) in the nation-state and ensure that local governments have 
adequate resources to promote social equity. And yet, scholars now question and redefine 
the very meanings of citizenship faced with globalization and other external influences on 
the nation-state. Irrespective of whether the effects of these developments are positive or 
negative, they have to be factored into the analyses of decentralization.  
 
Modern conceptions of citizenship, intricately tied to those of the nation-state, include a 
package of hard-fought-for rights that populations in Western democracies incrementally 
attained over the last two centuries. Sparke (2004) distinguishes three key forms of 
citizenship: civil citizenship, such as the right to protection of private property and 
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freedom of market access; political citizenship, such as the right to vote and run for 
office; and social citizenship, the guarantee of basic social necessities for a decent 
standard of living. In many decentralizing settings, local governments have been faulted 
for being unprepared for, or incapable of, adequately serving these goals of advancing 
citizenship. Local governments indeed often lack formal powers related to key civil 
citizenship rights as the respective authority is often vested with the national government 
or its deconcentrated state agencies; electoral rules related to who gets to sit on the 
councils often do not ensure broad-based citizen representation; and the local authorities’ 
financial powers are usually weak, hence the inadequacy of social services provision.  
 
And yet all of these issues are at the core of the debates about the weaknesses of the 
modern democratic polity as a whole. Some scholars argue that neo-liberalism and the 
imposition of market-based forms of governance have arguably strengthened the power 
of big business at the expense of citizen rights. These tendencies have also arguably 
resulted in the curtailing of social programs in Western democracies. Finally, in many 
democracies citizens feel they cannot influence the government through the ballot box 
(Sparke, 2004). 
   
In addition to these substantive aspects of citizenship, which bind ruler and ruled in a web 
of mutual rights and obligations, citizenship is also about national and local identity, or 
what Ribot refers to as belonging (2007). Ribot suggests that here too local governments 
are to play a pivotal role, fostering an integrated public domain and residency-based 
forms of citizenship and belonging in a given polity (Ribot, 2004, 2007). As at the advent 
of modernity, local governments are there to help turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ (Weber, 
1976). Particularly in developing settings, a democratically elected village council, it 
goes, should help overcome the ethnic, sectarian, or gender tensions and social structures 
of exclusion by fostering a broader civic-based identity.  
 
The world we are dealing with now, however, is far removed from the one described by 
Weber (1976), a fact that scholars of decentralization underestimate. In his essay on the 
deconstruction of the notion of identity boundaries in our current world, Migdal (2004:5) 
rightly discerns: ‘Many studies . . . continue to remain fixed and thematized at the level 
of the spatial and the geopolitical associated with the nation state’. Indeed, the mass 
media that succeeded in turning villagers into good national citizens at the advent of the 
modern age, as described by Weber, are now eroding the notions of belonging to one 
bounded space. The ‘mental maps’ that people construct for self-identifications, are as 
much products of socialization in their home country, as of absorbing information, 
imagery, and experience derived from other sources, be they local or global (Migdal, 
2004).  
 
Not only are the ‘mental boundaries’ redefined through contact with the world beyond 
the bounded state, but this world is also affecting the social, legal, and other frameworks 
deemed previously the nearly exclusive domain of the national government. Nowhere is 
this more evident than at the local level. Just as the local was once central to the success 
of the national project, it may now prove to be a crucial aspect in its undoing. This is 
because porous borders, flexible legal frameworks and markets facilitate external actors’ 
access to regions and localities bypassing the national government.  
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Such global-local links are bound to be particularly pronounced in resource-rich settings, 
where the local is more tied to the global than the national level, through production and 
export processes. In such areas, the local arena might be an object of ‘neocolonial’ 
(Lehtinen, n.d.) or otherwise exploitative practices from without (Swyngedouw, 2004; 
Steele, 2004), resulting in the ‘politics of democratic disempowerment’ by forces in the 
global economy (Grugel, 2003: 262).1 An example would be tax and regulatory 
concessions leading to the curtailing of social programs that large corporations win from 
local governments using threats of relocation of production (Sparke, 2004). The locals 
might also suffer from donor efforts with ‘questionable political or ideological agendas’ 
(Standing, 2004: 1070), that through a selective focus on some local actors serve to 
‘fragment the public domain’ (Ribot, 2004). Examples would be support for externally 
formed or funded committees or NGOs, which are there to rubber stamp external donor 
or business preferences irrespective of those of elected local bodies (Manor, 2005).  
 
Alternatively, however, the local setting might benefit from external actor efforts to foster 
citizenship (broadly defined) and strengthen democratic local governments. The precise 
models of governance will depend on the actors involved in this process; for example, 
EU versus US, and perceptions of these actors and their choices by the local people. In a 
globalized world, in which democracy is no longer something mapped straightforwardly 
‘onto territorial nation states’ (Grugel, 2003: 261), there is a whole range of such actors—
from transnational social movements, to more institutionalized regional and global 
governance regimes (Ingebritsen 2002). They provide local citizens with alternative 
norms, resources, and authority, contending with those of their own national governments 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Mukhopadhyay, 2005).  
 
Geographic proximity of localities to economic and political heavyweights is even more 
likely to encourage such governance characterized by ‘trans-territorial’ and ‘multi-
territorial’ problem-solving (Higgott, 2005: 585). These efforts need not be solely 
motivated by the devious ‘neocolonial’ (Lehtinen n.d.) logic of resource extraction. Such 
mega-players as EU tend to pursue external good governance efforts for environmental, 
poverty alleviation, security, or democracy reasons (Lankina, 2005).  
 
Territorial proximity also works to make the locals themselves more receptive to such 
influences. Although borders separate them from external players, such localities are 
more appropriately conceptualized as a ‘frontier’: rather than being sites of separation, 
they create opportunities for exchange and interaction, ultimately helping redefine the 
cognitive and practice boundaries separating ‘us’ from ‘them’ (Hibou, 2004; Migdal, 
2004). In local governance, cognitive shifts would reflect local people’s perceptions of 
legitimacy or effectiveness of external versus domestic templates, and in practice—
efforts to emulate those they find most appealing. 
   
The national level will continue to have tremendous salience and local governments will 
be still influenced by national laws and regulations. And yet particularly on a geographic 
frontier, the boundaries separating the domestic from the external will tend to become 
                                                 
1 Discussing Scholte (2000). 
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fuzzier when external actor efforts lead to greater institutional ‘isomorphism’ (Krasner, 
1995) or convergence between the local and the external, and when the ‘mental maps’ 
(Migdal, 2004) favor the external over the domestic. Rather than being passive recipients 
of imposed institutional choices by national governments and foreign donors, the locals 
are therefore here seen as active agents in the dynamic and unfolding processes of 
contestation and re-contestation of institutions, identities, and belonging (Chhatre, 2007). 
These processes are illustrated in the forestry-rich Russian Republic of Karelia. 
  
The article is structured as follows. Section two discusses the history of Karelia and the 
broader contexts shaping its current institution building. Section three focuses on 
Karelia’s local government development in the 1990s. Section four analyzes the impacts 
of domestic and external actor institutional choices on local understandings of democracy 
and governance. The conclusion discusses the implications of the conflicting institutional 
dynamics involving federal, external, and local actors, for democratic citizenship.  
 
KARELIA IN THE BROADER CONTEXTS 
Karelia’s historical legacies, frontier status and forestry resources affected the 
constellation of actors shaping its local government, which contrasts with that of many 
other Russian regions. 
 
Over eighty percent of Karelia’s territory is covered with forest. During the Cold War, 
the peculiarity of Karelia’s location on the USSR’s border with non-Communist Europe 
blocked access to forests in the heavily guarded border zone. Accordingly, along the 
Finno-Russian border Karelia boasts some of the best-preserved boreal forests in Europe. 
Outside of the 700 km border zone, however, the Soviet government set up timber 
industries. Currently, approximately sixty percent of Karelia’s industrial output comes 
from timber logging, wood processing, and paper pulp industries, with most of 
production outputs going to Western Europe (Zimin, n.d.).  
 
Karelia is one of the eighty-nine administrative regions that constitute the Russian 
Federation.2 The region has a historical legacy of ties to Finland, the latter being itself 
formerly part of the Russian empire. Geographically, Karelia straddles both territories in 
Russia and Finland, hence the distinction between Russian and Finnish Karelias (Paasi, 
1996).    
  
Similar to the other ethnically-defined republics in the Russian Soviet Socialist Federated 
Republic (RSFSR), Karelia occupied a higher status compared to the non-ethnically 
defined oblasti. The republics were created in the context of Stalin’s nationalities policies 
of the 1920s and 1930s according to which the recognized ethnic groups, such as the 
indigenous Karely, were entitled to a ‘homeland’ region.  
 
The USSR’s collapse in 1991 raised concerns that Russia would also follow suit and 
splinter. In the early 1990s, the republics used potential secession from Russia as a 
bargaining chip, ultimately securing important power-sharing prerogatives from Moscow, 
                                                 
2 Several regions are now being merged to form larger regions. 
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such as authority to manage natural resources. The republics were also allowed to engage 
in foreign relations, albeit on a limited scale. Finally, they were given relative freedom in 
their internal institution-building choices.  
 
These developments should be situated in the broader regional and international contexts. 
As in the other post-Communist states, Western donors became active in Russia. The EU 
was particularly influential in this process. The regional dimension was a crucial 
component of EU aid involvement for security and other reasons. A focus on 
geographically close areas was meant to mitigate such negative spillover effects of the 
‘problem’ neighbor as environmental pollution, crime, or human trafficking. Regional 
involvement also reflected a philosophy of sub-national development that arguably made 
the EU project itself tick. Within Europe, regionalization was seen not only as a means to 
mitigate minority nationalisms, but also to foster social cohesion. As a form of 
confidence-building among nations formerly at war, the concept of a Euro-region 
straddling national boundaries, likewise became a major policy success. With the Cold 
War over, these conceptions were to be applied to the post-Communist East so as to turn 
‘curtains of iron’ into those of ‘gold’ (Paasi, 1999).    
 
For Karelia in particular, the significance of these efforts was magnified due to its 
location on the Finnish border. The historical legacy of a divided region, now 
exacerbated by the vast socio-economic disparities between Russian and Finnish Karelias 
acquired new salience in the post- Cold War context. Rather than contesting and reifying 
the political boundaries separating Russia and Finland, much of the discourse among the 
Finnish policy and academic elite conceptualized the area as a frontier. While borders or 
boundaries have a more formal meaning as lines of separation between two states, 
frontiers lack clear demarcations and are instead conceived of as a meeting place of 
networks, cultures, and societies (Paasi, 1999). The most local units—individuals, 
communities, townships—become important to this conception: the more points of 
contact among them, the more they underline fuzziness of the frontier, the overlapping 
and transcending nature of space and boundaries. 
 
The loose constellation of center-regional relations in Russia, the EU’s developmental 
philosophy, and the peculiarities of Finnish conceptions of Karelia—these were the 
broader contexts in which Karelia’s post-communist institutional development unfolded. 
The following section turns to the discussion of Karelia’s local government trajectory as 
shaped by these factors. 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF CHOICE 
Local Authority, National Frameworks, and International Aid 
Until 1995, the national frameworks for local government in Russia continued to be 
amended versions of soviet laws and decrees. In 1995, the federal government adopted a 
new law, which survived until 2003. The 1995 legislation was rather general in nature. It 
mandated the separation of local government from state authority and allowed the regions 
to have local institutional arrangements of their choosing. The vagueness of the law was 
only matched by the degree of federal enforcement with many regions violating even the 
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most basic provision of separation of local government from state power. The result was 
a patchwork of institutional arrangements which varied from region to region and ranged 
from soviet-style administrative hierarchies with powers of appointment and dismissal 
leading up to the regional governor, to elected authorities with meaningful powers and 
autonomy from regional bodies. It is important to note here that the republics were not 
usually among the latter group of regions. While invoking ‘freedom’ and ‘sovereignty’ in 
their own struggles with the federal center, they were themselves eager to tramp on local 
government powers and institutionalize its dependence on regional authority.  
 
Karelia, however, did not fit into this pattern, a contrast with other regions that our study 
will hopefully help explain. In the 1990s it emerged as one of the leaders in local 
government development, although it did face many of the same problems plaguing local 
governance elsewhere. Still, in comparative terms, Karelia’s local government is more 
developed than in most of Russia’s other regions. Scholars point to Karelia’s institutional 
choices in the course of the 1990s, when the regions were free to experiment with local 
institution-building (Gel’man et al., 2002). Until the most recent federal recentralizing 
reforms, Karelia maintained democratically elected local authorities at all levels. This 
contrasted with many other regions where local executives were governor appointees or 
were otherwise subordinate to the regional authorities. In a comprehensive study, which 
ranked regional democratic performance, Karelia likewise emerged at the top of the list 
(Petrov, 2005). Even within the framework of a new centralist law on local government 
passed by the authoritarian administration of President Vladimir Putin, many of Karelia’s 
local authorities opted for institutional arrangements perceived to be more democratic 
than those chosen in other regions.3
 
As elsewhere, Karelia’s local government arrangements were a product of contending 
influences—federal, regional, and local—with the region-specific power and resource 
constellations affecting the balance between the various levels of authority. What makes 
Karelia stand out however, is the role of external actors, EU in particular, in providing a 
menu of local institutional options and resources for local development. The EU and 
other European bodies, such as the Council of Europe, regard democratically constituted 
and socially responsive municipalities as important for polity-wide democracy. This 
premise is embodied in a special Council of Europe Charter and EU Technical Assistance 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programs in Russia aimed at 
municipal development (Lankina, 2005). The Nordic states, which have been active in 
Karelia, Finland in particular, but also Sweden and Norway, also boast some of the 
highest levels of municipal autonomy among democratic nations. They have been keen to 
export their models to post-Communist neighbors—with both EU moneys and their 
national funds. 
 
Studies of foreign aid suggest that a proclaimed goal of decentralization does not always 
match the realities of the actors being empowered on the ground. Under the banner of 
democracy promotion, it has been argued, Western actors support private bodies, civil 
society organizations, or deconcentrated state authorities operating at a local level (Ribot, 
                                                 
3 Popular election of mayors. Alexandr Potsikovskiy, Head of Administration of Prionezhskiy rayon, 
interview, Petrozavodsk, January 2006. 
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2004). Resource rich areas or those designated as nature reserves have been arguably 
particularly prone to such politics of local government non-choice (Spierenburg et al., 
2007; Ribot, 2004).  
 
To what extent did external choices in Karelia mirror these patterns? In order to address 
this question, the author constructed a dataset of EU projects conducted in the regions 
from 1991 until 2005, i.e., for the first decade and a half of Russia’s post-communist 
development. In its aid projects, the EU distinguishes between federal and regional 
components. Federal projects cover policies of national significance, such as pension and 
tax reform or nuclear safety. In the regional component, the EU specifically targets local 
agencies. Federal actors may be involved, but only if a project includes several regions 
and requires federal coordination, or if it is of federal significance.4
 
The dataset distinguishes between federal bodies, regional and local governments, NGOs, 
universities, and private agencies. It shows that the EU targets both the regional bodies 
and municipalities for donor assistance. The record varies from region to region, but 
Karelia in particular stands out for a large share of projects aimed at municipal 
development. Between 1991 and 2005, Karelia was the main beneficiary in seventy EU-
funded projects. Local government shared the first place with regional government as the 
beneficiary of the largest number of projects, twenty-four. NGOs were listed as main 
beneficiaries in only seven projects, and federal actors, in two. In terms of volumes of 
funding, regional bodies emerge at the top of the list, which is explained by the larger 
scale of projects they are involved with. The data for Karelia contrast with nation-wide 
data on the regional component of EU aid, with local government occupying only the 
sixth place in terms of the number of projects in which it served as a key partner.5  
 
Examination of project activity and interviews with Technical Assistance to the CIS 
(TACIS) and other donors in Karelia’s capital city of Petrozavodsk and Moscow, as well 
as with local grantees, also suggests that donors stress cooperation between local 
governments and non-state local actors in project assistance.6 These project records are a 
reflection of continental Europe’s own governance patterns. Unlike the US with its stress 
on neo-liberal models of governance with a privileged position for markets and non-state 
actors, the EU is not averse to work with formal democratic institutions like local 
authorities. The social or ‘cohesion’ dimension of citizenship is also very prominent in 
EU project activity: many projects target municipalities-NGO cooperation in improving 
                                                 
4 Interview with Aleksandr Berdino, Director, TACIS Regional Support Office, Petrozavodsk, 5 July 2004. 
5 Breakdown of projects by main beneficiary for Karelia: Local governments: 24; regional bodies: 24; 
NGOs: 7; universities: 4; federal bodies: 2; unspecified: 2; think tank: 1. Breakdown by beneficiary for all 
Russian regions: University: 283; regional bodies: 246; NGOs: 184; federal bodies: 139; private agencies, 
such as corporations and private utility companies: 137; local government: 124; unspecified: 23; think tank: 
9; schools: 2. Source: author-compiled from data available at: http://62.38.207.105/tacis/en/index.asphttp://
www.tacis-lso-rf.org/en/objectives.asp (accessed 15 November 2005). 
6 Interviews in Petrozavodsk with Tatyana Klekacheva, Executive Director, Swedish Karelian Business and 
Information Center, 9 July 2004; Galina Yushkova, Karelian Center for Gender Research, 9 July 2004; 
Irina Nazarova, Project Coordinator, Information Office and Contact Centre, Nordic Council of Ministers, 
7 July 2004; Vera Meshko, Chief Specialist, Department of External Affairs, Administration, 7 July 2004.  
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local welfare provision or that between local governments and trade unions.7 These 
patterns contrast with American donor assistance elsewhere; the US shows preference for 
work with non-state actors like political parties or NGOs (Carothers, 1999).  
 
Finally, the very structure of EU funding privileges local governments and forces NGOs 
to cooperate with them (Lankina, 2005). Many TACIS projects require the support of 
local authorities even when an NGO files an application.8 This could range anything 
from a signature to commitment to participate as one of the project partners. Applications 
also have co-financing requirements of up to twenty-five percent of the total funding. 
This likewise encourages partnership arrangements: while NGOs are unlikely to meet this 
requirement due to funding constraints, municipalities have the capacity to contribute this 
share in kind by allocating a full time local government official to run a project, or 
providing office premises. As one local official stated, co-financing could mean 
‘premises for seminars, halls, rental payments, communal utility expenses, partly staff 
salaries, and so on ’.9
 
The official in charge of TACIS projects in Karelia thus explained the EU’s preference 
for work with local authorities, as opposed to NGOs: ‘What kind of salaries do NGO 
[workers] have? All are volunteers, there are no salaries. Here is the trick. And the 
administrations of cities, regions, they can allocate staff, they have decent salaries, so the 
co-financing turns out to be decent especially if many persons are involved’.10 In many 
localities, NGOs are dependent on local governments to begin with, relying on them for 
premises, utilities, and other infrastructure support.11 In small towns and villages, which 
Nordic neighbors, such as Finland, often target for project activity in cross-border 
cooperation projects, NGO capacity is even weaker than in medium and large towns, and 
the local authorities tend to serve as broader project umbrella agencies.   
 
The substantial aid volumes were instrumental in shaping Karelia’s local government 
institutions in the 1990s. One study, which sought to explain variations in local 
democracy among Russia’s regions in the first post-communist decade, identified the 
‘transboundary factor’ as key to explaining Karelia’s local government development 
(Gel’man et al., 2002). This factor was important in Karelia’s adoption in 1994, the first 
among Russian regions, of a democratic law on local government. The law specifically 
took North European institutions as models. Another comparative study found that 
Karelia differed from other regions where American donors have been more active than 
EU. It found that to a greater extent than in the other regions, Karelia maintains 
cooperative and consensual modes of interaction between NGOs and local governments, 
characteristic of continental Europe (Belokurova and Yargomskaya, 2005). 
 
The resulting institutional arrangements also played into the region-specific political 
dynamics because they affected the resource base of the mayors of larger cities, who 
                                                 
7 For example, the Swedish city administration coordinated project working with trade unions aimed at 
combating alcohol use on the workplace. Klekacheva. 
8 Interview with Svetlana Shlykova, Regional Coordinator, Open World Center, Petrozavodsk, 9 July 2004. 
9 Meshko. 
10 Berdino. 
11 Yushkova. 
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conflicted over power and resources with the regional governor. For example, Gel’man et 
al. (2002: 230-231; 245) show how in an effort to extend his power base, the mayor of 
the regional capital tapped into the many possibilities of attracting EU grants. The mayor 
could be successful in obtaining grants in competition against other municipalities and 
regional bodies, however only if he could demonstrate the democratic nature of his 
administration and its social and economic performance.  
 
Importantly, until the end of the 1990s, when the Kremlin maintained more of a hands-off 
approach towards the regions, the federal government played only a marginal role in the 
process. For example, when the mayor of a regional city tried to attract federal funding to 
strengthen his institutional power base, ‘the hope for help from the federal center was in 
vain, whereas Western sources turned out to be more effective’. ‘Generally’, write 
Gel’man et al. (2002: 230-231; 245), ‘international factors continue[d] to play a certain 
role in the maintenance of the political autonomy of the city’.  
 
Local Government and Forestry Decentralization 
These aid patterns may have also had an indirect impact on governance in the area of 
forestry resources management. Our research does not support the claim that 
‘neocolonial’ raw material extraction interests guided the Western neighbors’ 
involvement in the region (Lehtinen, n.d.). If anything, donor government policies 
conflicted with the timber-related trade and investment interests of their private 
businesses. By supporting local government development, donors indirectly endorsed 
Karelia’s practices of ‘administrative paternalism’ (Bessudnov, 2004)—a way of 
encouraging forest enterprises to adopt ‘socially responsible’ business practices. The 
practice was institutionalized in the operation of the forestry commission in charge of 
allocating forestry plots, which included both regional authorities and federal bodies. 
Enterprises that the commission allowed to engage in forestry exploitation were selected 
based upon their pledge to accept social obligations vis-à-vis the local workforce and 
broader citizenry (Bessudnov, 2004).  Generally, because enterprises often depend on the 
regional government for preferential tax treatment and other privileges, they are 
vulnerable to regional pressures, and have strong incentives to comply.  
 
In contrast to regional authorities, local governments were not formally endowed with 
extensive forestry management authority. The 1997 forest code and the 1995 local 
government law were vague on local authority in forestry management, referring to local 
governments as ‘participants in forestry relations’ without specifying their precise 
functions in this regard. As with other general provisions of this legislation, their 
interpretation and practical application varied from region to region. In Karelia, de facto 
however, the regional authorities’ backing endured that local administrations enjoyed 
some leverage in forestry exploitation decisions. They could pressure timber companies 
operating in their jurisdictions to perform services to the local citizenry, for which they 
lacked funding. These could range from supplying households with firewood to survive 
the harsh Northern winter, to repairing a roof in the local kindergarten, to building 
heating facilities, roads and other infrastructure. 
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The practices of ‘administrative paternalism’, however, in the longer term were 
instrumental in crowding out both the larger federal timber industry competitors, and 
scaring off foreign investors, mostly from those same Nordic states that sponsored 
developmental projects in the region (Zimin, n.d.).12 Until 2000, the large economic 
interests, known in Russia as Financial-Industrial Groupings (FIGs) were actually 
scarcely interested in penetrating Karelia’s timber sector. In recent years, however, they 
have sought to capture this market, controlled by the regional authorities or smaller 
regional firms (Bessudnov, 2004). In this they were helped, directly or indirectly, by the 
federal government reforms aimed at recentralizing power and control over natural 
resources. 
 
Re-centralization and Forestry 
The latest federal reforms were a departure from the Yel’tsin era federalism when the 
regions enjoyed substantial prerogatives in local government institution-building and 
natural resource governance. The 2003 local government law has sought to introduce 
greater uniformity of institutional arrangements across all regions. The law had the effect 
of changing the structures of accountability, reestablishing or reinforcing upward 
linkages. It provided for three main tiers of local authority with popularly elected 
councils—settlements, municipal counties and city districts. With regard to the chief 
local executive, the law provided for several options: the (1) ‘mayor-council’ model, 
based on popular election of council deputies and city mayors as chief executives; (2) the 
‘city manager’ model, whereby elected local deputies hire a chief executive who is 
nominated by a special commission that includes regional governor appointees; (3) a 
mixed model, whereby the elected mayor is reduced to chairing the local council, while a 
hired city manager is vested with the powers of chief local executive (Gel’man and 
Lankina, 2007). The regions acquired significant influence over the appointment of the 
key local executive in municipalities with the city manager-type model. The governor 
and regional legislature also acquired extended powers in removing even the popularly 
elected mayors, disbanding local councils, or setting up temporary regional 
administrations in the localities.13  
 
The politics of dis-empowerment also extended to the local governments’ prerogatives in 
the area of natural resources, such as forestry. In an effort to re-acquire control over 
natural resources and submitting to lobbying pressures from large timber industries, the 
Putin administration overhauled previous modes of forestry management. Although 
forests are federally owned, the regions enjoyed prerogatives over timber exploitation. In 
2004 the government passed an amendment to the forest code endowing the center with 
management powers over local forests. It also proposed a controversial new forestry 
code. The federal government produced successive drafts of the code without any 
substantive involvement of the broader public.14  
                                                 
12 Top participant countries: Germany: 203; Finland: 181; United Kingdom: 159; France: 141; Netherlands: 
70; Italy: 68; Belgium: 51; Denmark: 46; Sweden: 45; Austria: 30. 
13 Law on The Common Principles for Organizing the Legislative and Executive Branches of State Power 
in the Russian Regions.  
14 And forestry experts. Interviews with Alexey Yaroshenko, Forest Campaign Coordinator, Greenpeace 
Russia, Moscow, 2 February 2006; and Andrei Gromtsev, Vice Director for Science, Forest Research 
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The final version of the code, which entered into force on 1 January 2007, gave back the 
powers of forestry management to the regional authorities that the 2004 amendment had 
deprived them of. The code, together with the new local government law, however, 
provides for only marginal involvement of the local governments in forestry exploitation 
decision-making, largely limiting it to forests already in municipal ownership. According 
to the 2003 local government law only forests that are within the residential (emphasis 
added) territory of the lowest level of local government authority, or settlements, and of 
urban city districts, are in local government ownership.15 There are no provisions for 
forest ownership by larger territorial units, the municipal counties. Municipal authority 
that the code refers to therefore covers a limited range of forest land that has low 
economic significance and is mostly recreational in nature. 
 
Timber industry lobbying of the code is reflected in the business first nature of forestry 
exploitation decision-making, which further marginalizes local governments. Critics of 
the code focus on the system for allocating long-term leases of forest plots and their 
exploitation for non-forestry related purposes. The code has provided for auctions, 
whereby the sole criterion is the amount of money offered by the highest bidder to state, 
regional or municipal authorities who decide to auction plots. Alternative ways of 
allocating the land would have been through competition or konkursy. In a konkursy, 
decisions would have been based on a bidder’s willingness to take on a set of obligations 
related to the social, economic, and environmental concerns of the local populations. 
While the code refers to municipalities as ‘participants in forestry relations’ endowed 
with management powers, its article 50.2 forbids local and other authorities from making 
decisions that ‘in any way could lead to prohibitions against, limitations on, or 
elimination of, private competition’.16 Any local government decision, in an auction or 
otherwise, related to socially equitable and sustainable forestry management could be 
construed as violating this provision. 
 
These federal reforms, with their imposition of an administrative template on all regions, 
and the disempowerment of elected bodies in natural resource management were a 
departure from the ‘formative years’ of Karelia’s local government development.  
 
FRAGMENTED BELONGING ON THE FRONTIER 
Karelia illustrates how government politics of disempowerment may clash with the more 
enabling institutional choices of external actors. As frontier region, it straddles the 
discrepancy between Western neighbor fostered expectations of what local government 
should be about, and the increasingly authoritarian central state. Although compared to 
Russia’s other regions, Karelia ranks highly in terms of local democracy, its residents 
have strongly negative and pessimistic opinions about local governance. The local is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Institute of the Karelian Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Petrozavodsk, 16 January 
2006. 
15 Article 50. Available from http://www.rg.ru/2003/10/08/zakonsamouprav.html (accessed 1 August 
2007). 
16 Available from http://www.duma.gov.ru/cnature/workgroups/les/les_kod.htm (accessed 1 August 2007). 
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consistently compared and juxtaposed to Western models, to which Karelia had been 
exposed more than any other region. The ‘West’, and specifically, EU, Finland and other 
Nordic states serve as reference points shaping local perceptions of Russian state and 
regional policies in Karelia, as indeed the regional government’s choice of institutions 
and practices concerning representation and citizenship. 
 
The discussion in this section is framed using Migdal’s concept of ‘mental maps ’. 
Migdal refers to mental maps as incorporating ‘elements of the meaning people attach to 
spatial configurations, the loyalties they hold, the emotions and passions that groupings 
evoke, and their cognitive ideas about how the world is constructed’ (Migdal, 2004: 7). 
For the purposes of this article, ‘mapping’ Karelia’s ‘mental maps’ is important not in a 
static sense, but as a means to understanding the dynamic and unfolding identity shifts 
and how they shape past and current practices and institutions. This discussion is based 
on a series of in-depth interviews that the author conducted in August 2004 and January 
2006—with local government officials, councilors, NGO activists, forestry scientists, and 
the timber business community. The timing of the interviews, against the background of 
federal local government and forestry reforms, allows one to discern how institutional 
change is perceived and acted out through locally specific and Western-influenced lenses.  
 
The interviews reveal that normative ideas about local government institutions are shaped 
by external actors even when they do not match the actual developments on the ground. 
Moreover, the local reality is contrasted with Western templates. It is these templates that 
provide the cognitive understandings of what is desirable and legitimate in contrast to 
models imposed by the central state. The availability of these normative templates from 
next door neighbors helps explain the paradox of the locals’ criticisms of Karelian local 
government despite the reality of the region being among those with the most 
representative and developed local governments.  
 
Interview data provide insights into the local attitudes toward representation, citizenship, 
and belonging. Local government officials invoke the West when criticizing the regional 
authorities’ top-down manner of decision-making that neglects the preferences of local 
elected authorities and when talking about citizen rights, as opposed to just obligations 
vis-à-vis the state. Perceptions of local government itself change as donors encourage the 
locals to perceive the local authorities as institutions that could have a productive 
relationship with the local community, in collaboration with NGOs, rather than being 
simple targets for blame attribution. Expectations of local government role in forestry 
resources management, its social cohesion function, and relationships with the private 
sector, are also shaped by the West. And the national government is no longer seen as the 
sole source of normative and legal authority. Instead, we see Karelians invoking their 
northern identity, in juxtaposition to the center, and looking outside of their national 
boundaries in search of normative templates and legal solutions to vital local issues.  
 
Local councilors and mayors expressed frustrations with discrepancies between 
normative ideals of formal arrangements for citizen representation shaped through 
countless training seminars in, and city twinning activities with Nordic neighbors, and the 
federal and regional politics of disempowerment . A mayor of a municipal district, the 
self-described ‘most progressive mayor in Karelia’ begins the interview with a reference 
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to his training in Sweden, ‘probably the most advanced country from the point of view of 
local self-government’. He then contrasts Swedish local government with the lack of 
formal powers of his administration and subordination to regional and central state 
agencies:  
 
Here we have centralization of power and it is dangerous to talk openly. As head of the 
rayon [municipal district], my open statements will lead to problems for ordinary people. 
Say, tomorrow you will write that I said something against the governor, and then 
someone from the government will call and say: ‘Are you crazy, do you have mental 
problems? Go and print a disclaimer in the paper, because if you don’t, there are many 
ways we can beat the hell out of you!’ Say, if you need fuel, they will [not give funding 
for it to you] and will say: ‘Go ahead and freeze ’. In reality, though, it is their obligation 
to give me this money, not their right. 
 
The possibilities for influencing the mayor are colossal . . . Of course, I would like to 
work in a modern [emphasis added] way, whereby I could call the top manager 
[governor, emphasis added] from here, or he could call me, in the framework of normal 
business relations, but in reality we haven’t met once, I can’t even technically reach him 
if I were to call.  
 
The mayor’s reference point for such statements using the Western word menedzher for 
governor (manager) is Sweden or other Western states symbolizing all that is modern. 
Other Russian regions, where local government practices might be worse than in Karelia, 
are not used as a reference point. The distinction between rights and obligations is also 
interesting. It points at the Soviet and pre-Soviet Russian tradition of subordinating 
society and individual to the state. The strong belief that he has a right to expect certain 
obligations from the state for his constituents as a popularly elected representative of the 
local people is a reflection of a Western liberal conception of citizenship, and not the 
reality that he observes in his daily practice. 
 
Western actors likewise influence ideas about local government decision-making 
involving NGOs and broader publics. This shift in perceptions is illustrated in the 
narratives of an environmental NGO activist, who had received grants from Sweden, 
Finland, the Netherlands, and other European countries specifically aimed at fostering 
local government links with NGOs and the local communities. ‘At some point, the 
Norwegians said we should work with municipalities’, recalls the activist citing the 
following example from one of the projects:  
 
The task was to gather people for two days in the rayon center and discuss sustainable 
development of the rayon. It is rare here that people work with local government together 
and not regard it as a conflict zone but a discussion zone instead. People tend to come to 
the local government to start a fight, say, when there is no street lighting. And this time 
around too, the planned dialogue started with conflict with claims that the village has no 
safe water. People made their complaints, and then the local government [official] said: 
‘Why do you throw garbage on the streets?’ [a practice that contributes to bad sanitation 
in the city] . . . But then people started asking questions . . . In the end the discussion was 
very good . . . for the first time perhaps as normally there is no dialogue with local self-
government . . . And the local government saw that the people are not lacking in 
initiative.17
                                                 
17 Interview with Ludmila Morozova, Head, Karelian Branch of the All-Russian Society for the Protection 
of Nature, Petrozavodsk, 19 January 2006. 
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In this case the Western donor-initiated discussion helped change citizens’ perception 
that local government has no relationship with the local community, toward a recognition 
that it is at least an agency to have a ‘dialogue’ with. Such a perception would be vastly 
at odds with the normative understandings of local self-government in democratic 
Western settings, some of which even go as far as regarding it as the sum total of the 
local people’s will. Local people’s perception is far removed from expectations of 
democratic accountability of the local councilors whom the people themselves had 
elected. The dialogue in Karelia is an example of getting one step closer to changing this 
perception.  
 
Perceptions of local and national government role in advancing social citizenship rights 
are likewise influenced by Western exposure. The European concept of social cohesion, 
which implies addressing socio-economic inequalities not only for developmental 
purposes, but also as a way of fostering broader, inclusive, citizenship, is frequently 
inferred in discussions with municipal practitioners and other local actors. Awareness of 
EU policies of social cohesion shapes expectations of local government role in addressing 
local inequities in Karelia. It also shapes perceptions of the federal center’s local 
government reforms, which are blamed for subverting the social component of 
citizenship.  
 
A representative of Karelia’s Association of Municipalities, for example, maintained: 
‘Decentralization in European Union member states is all about cohesion’. The logic of 
social cohesion, he surmises, is behind the recent trend in EU member states of 
regionalization. He suggests that such spatial consolidation of local authorities into larger 
units better addresses developmental planning and redistributive needs of smaller 
localities. This he contrasts with the Russian federal government’s latest reform, whereby 
popularly elected local governments had been created at even the tiniest village levels, 
but with no capacity for performing social services or managing local resources.18 The 
above statement may be a misrepresentation of the complexity and diversity of local 
government arrangements in EU member states. It is nonetheless illustrative of how 
policies of the Western neighbor, albeit in a somewhat selective fashion, are held up as a 
standard against which to measure domestic developments. 
 
Local actors also invoke the West in references to ‘socially responsive’ business practices 
in the timber industry. ‘In the West, social partnerships are very developed. In Europe, 
for example’, maintained a scholar who had been involved in a TACIS-funded study of 
the ‘village sotsium’ in forestry towns in Karelia. ‘It would be just for the local level to 
receive compensation [from forestry proceeds]’, she noted.19  
 
The ‘most progressive’ mayor, in whose locality a business takeover of a timber plant 
had recently occurred resulting in dozens of lay-offs, fumes that nobody even informed 
him of the planned take-over, let alone consulted him. His expectations of participatory 
                                                 
18 Interview, Association of Municipalities of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, 17 January 2006. The interviewee 
preferred to remain anonymous. 
19 Discussion with Galina Kozyreva, Senior Researcher, Institute of Economics, Karelian Regional Chapter, 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Petrozavodsk, 19 January 2006. 
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and socially responsive forestry management are likewise inspired by his ideas about 
business practices in the West: 
 
Nowadays, a system of relationships is built such that the federal structures and law, 
unfortunately, I regret to say, it is all about naked business [business first]. As far as I 
know in Sweden and even in the US . . . the stock exchange ratings [of a company] fall 
when its social parameters falls, when an enterprise sheds its social burdens, i.e., that 
means something is wrong with that enterprise . . . And we don’t have it here. While in 
the West, such social dimensions are very prominent.  
 
Another example of the negativizing of the ‘Russian realities’, which refer to both lack of 
formal local government powers to influence resource use, and the lack of citizen 
awareness of their rights, is the local Greens activist’s critique of the forest code: 
 
The Russian realities will be playing a huge role, and they will lead to simple degradation 
when this code is adopted, of forests, will create social issues . . . We think the owner of 
the forest will not care about ecology and social issues. See, on the question of social 
responsibility, we are only beginning to talk about it in Russia . . . Our population may 
not even understand what is happening on their land.  
 
And yet not only do interviews reveal juxtapositions between the negativized Russia, ‘us’ 
versus the idealized West, ‘them’, but also broader self-identifications signifying greater 
cognitive proximity to the West. In interviews, Karelia is frequently identified with the 
broader geographical ‘North’, which is juxtaposed to the central state, in that the former 
espouses more ‘socially responsible’ and environmentally sustainable approaches to 
nature and resources than the latter: ‘We have certain traditions here. The North has been 
traditionally famous for clever, sustainable use of resources, and this has to be preserved’, 
urged an Association of Municipalities representative. He then goes on to criticize the 
draft federal forestry code, and particularly its provisions on auctions, which tramp on the 
principles of socially responsive and sustainable forest use: 
 
Here in the local arena I think there are expectations that these processes [timber 
management] could be regulated for the benefit of the local people, including when 
someone wins a bid [in an auction], one can set conditions that he [the bidder] builds 
roads, does something for the social needs . . .  
 
There are tons of issues that could be decided with people participation . . . I think we 
have to discuss this code . . . Our federal bodies need to try to ensure . . . that the local 
level could be more effectively engaged so that the mechanisms of its involvement would 
be more clearly outlined in the forest code. I saw the latest version, and there the social 
component is very weak. It is very general with no real impulse for local governments to 
use their right to influence forest use. 
 
The West is not only invoked in normative understandings about local democracy, which 
are unattainable in practice given ‘Russian realities’. Instead, it is looked upon as a source 
of legal authority that might shape formal structures of decision-making within Russia 
itself. The European Union forestry certification initiative is a case in point. The EU had 
been pushing for forestry certification partly as a way of decreasing illegal logging and 
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thereby ensuring sustainable development in the forestry communities.20 While it is 
premature to discuss the influence of these policies on forestry management and local 
livelihoods, their impact on attitudes is already evident. Local actors invoke this initiative 
as key to changing the environmental and social dimension of timber management in 
Karelia, and setting curbs on the predatory implications of the forest code. ‘Maybe 
forestry certification will help reorient the forestry business . . . It might be the key factor 
that will influence this here’, maintained a local scholar involved in a study of the social 
implications of timber industry restructuring in the localities.  
 
‘What you can’t go against is forest certification coming under pressure from Europe. 
The Finns have long adopted thirty-two parameters for certification’, echoed an 
Association of Municipalities practitioner.21 The local Greens activist is likewise 
enthusiastic about the potentially ‘very strong’ influence of certification, including on 
shaping Russia’s timber related legislation. Already, ‘Europe has voiced its concerns over 
the draft forest code’. ‘They [in Europe] understand the importance of heritage’, he 
maintained.22  
 
These discourses are revealing of the ideals, understandings, and hopes derived from 
Western sources in Karelia. Deeply pessimistic and negative about ‘Russian realities’, 
they obscure the fact that Karelia is among Russia’s top regions in local government 
development. This suggests that not only are Western influences integrated into people’s 
views, but also into actual institutional choices and practices. Testimony to this fact is 
that notwithstanding the broader authoritarian context, most recently Karelia chose local 
government institutional arrangements that, to a certain extent, reflected the Western 
ideals discussed above, while resisting federal efforts at recentralization.  
 
There is substantial evidence that the national government sought to impose a particular 
local government template in the localities, one that would strengthen the ‘power 
vertical’ and make local governments accountable to higher levels of authority. As in 
many other regions, in Karelia, the pro-Putin United Russia (UR), the ‘party of power’, 
became a major instrument of Kremlin policy making. The Kremlin invested substantial 
resources into building up United Russia’s (UR) centralized organizational structure with 
branches in all regions, co-opting governors of some seventy out of a total of eighty-six 
Russia’s regions (Hale, 2006; Gel’man, 2006; Goode, 2007) and establishing majority 
factions in most regional legislatures. Karelia’s governor also became a UR supporter, 
actively pushing its local government reform agenda in the region.  
 
According to the new local government law, Karelia was to set up new municipal 
formations by the end of 2005. Although the law provided strict guidelines as to the 
structures of local governments, the localities had the option of choosing the form of 
election of the chief local executive. Many regions opted for chief executive election by 
the local council from amongst local council deputies. In Russia, this practice is 
                                                 
20 See Paavo Pelkonen, ‘Nachalas’ razrabotka Initsiativy Barentseva regiona po lesnoi otrasli ’, University 
of Joensuu, http://www.webstudio.fi/vyh/archive/2002_1/juttu551.htm (accessed 1 May 2006) 
21 Interview with Alexei Morozov, Association of Municipalities of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, 17 January 
2006. 
22 Interview with Dmitry Rybakov, Association of Greens of Karelia, Petrozavodsk, 19 January 2006. 
 16
considered to be easy to manipulate from above23 and procedurally less democratic as the 
councilor who gets to be the chief local executive is elected by only a small fraction of 
the local constituencies.  
 
Significantly, many of Karelia’s localities opted for the alternative arrangement of 
popular election of mayors. Although the UR council deputies pushed for the non-
popular elected executive model, opposition deputies were able to block it.24 This was 
pointed out to the author by one of the mayors elected according to the new legislation. A 
participant in numerous Western municipal training programs, he recalls how at one of 
the training sessions, local officials from other regions praised Karelia for opting for this 
form of election. ‘This is because you guys in Karelia are more Western’, they are 
alleged to have said.  
 
Developments in the regional capital, Petrozavodsk, further illustrate the struggles 
between efforts to preserve local autonomy—with Western influences playing a strong 
role—and federal and regional attempts at curbing it. In 2006, the regional governor, a 
UR supporter, insisted that the city council add amendments to its Charter eliminating 
popular election of city mayor and reducing the number of local deputies. While the UR 
deputies enthusiastically endorsed the proposal, opposition deputies vetoed it. Faced with 
continued resistance to governor’s efforts to push through the UR agenda, the governor 
and the UR-dominated republican legislature filed a legal suit against the city council, 
which was then dissolved pursuant to a court decision. The deputies then appealed to the 
Council of Europe. Invoking democratic norms and the need to abide by the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, which Russia ratified, they also went on hunger 
strike; some were hospitalized. In March 2007, the opposition secured a stunning victory 
in the Petrozavodsk city council elections. Petrozavodsk thus preserved the institutional 
status quo and the independence of its local government (Gel’man and Lankina, 2007). 
 
CONCLUSION: INTERNALIZING THE EXTERNAL 
Karelia illustrates that representation and citizenship cannot be conceptualized solely in 
national terms. Authority of actors beyond the central state contribute to the generation of 
norms and play a major role in influencing local discourse and subsequent choices of 
local government arrangements. These trans-boundary processes have become even more 
prominent in the era of globalization (Keohane, 2002; Grugel, 2003).  
 
The central state continues to control the procedural aspects of local government 
institutions. If these institutions fail to safeguard the social, civil, and political 
components of citizenship, then local actors are more likely to look beyond their national 
government for normative reference points to back their claims for local empowerment. 
Multiple referencing and domestic-external links involving a plurality of state and non-
state actors is now characteristic of governance worldwide (Mukhopadhay, 2005; Keck 
                                                 
23 Assessments of merits of the respective institutions should be grounded in specific contexts. The 
empirical record is mixed. I am grateful for this point to Ashwini Chhatre.  
24 On protests against this move, see http://www.newsinfo.ru/news/2006/04/prn_news1311791.php?id_r= 
(accessed 15 June 2006).  
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and Sikkink, 1998). It is particularly pertinent in frontier regions like Karelia. Here 
formal belonging in a closed, predatory, and authoritarian state is contrasted with the 
Joneses right across the fence, who are not simply Western, but exemplify all that is best 
in the West—starting from the Nordic states’ democratic local government models, to 
their social welfare and cohesion. 
 
Here the imposed central state authority is locked in conflict with the more-empowering 
and enabling normative and institutional frameworks propagated by Western actors. Does 
this result in ‘fragmented belonging’ (Ribot, 2007)? Yes. But the authoritarian central 
state associated with Moscow, hundreds of miles away, that denies basic citizenship 
rights to its own nationals may not be any more ‘internal’ than Western neighbors a 
stone’s throw away who seek to foster this very citizenship. As Holston and Appadurai 
rightly suggest, while the liberal project of a ‘national society of citizens’ is of 
questionable appeal for those to whom substantive citizenship is denied, new kinds of 
citizenship emerge with new sources of law and authority extending beyond the nation 
state (Holston and Appadurai, 2003: 297). In the case of Karelia, the proximity to liberal 
democratic neighbors produces local expectations of similar institutional arrangements—
a sense of belonging to both Russia and to the normative order of the West next door.  
 
‘Mental maps’, as Joel Migdal argues, while being social constructions, also ‘mark and 
maintain the separation between groups’. Karelians’ perceptions of local realities in 
juxtaposition to the West appear to be an example of such group boundary maintenance: 
however positive the references to the West, it is still ‘them’ versus ‘us’. The dynamic 
nature of such mental identity boundaries, nevertheless, is most evident when ‘competing 
boundaries, demanding different, even contradictory practices and mental images, bump 
against one another . . . And as boundaries do clash and people encapsulated by them 
make choices about which demands to follow and which to ignore, those boundaries 
change’, ‘inducing them to choose which boundaries, principles and practices to submit 
to and which to violate’. It is in such situations, writes Migdal, that ‘one finds sites of 
social struggle and social change’ (Migdal, 2004: 13, 23).   
 
Karelia’s choice of more-democratic local institutions illustrates an unfolding social and 
institutional process that resists the wider authoritarian context. Rather than being 
recipients of externally imposed ‘politics of choice and recognition’, (Ribot, 2004) local 
people are themselves important agents in the choice and transformation of local 
institutions. This makes us optimistic that over time Karelia is likely to witness an even 
more active ‘renewal of citizenship and struggles for it’, rather than wallow in a ‘more 
passive sense of entitlement to benefits which seem to derive from remote sources’ 
(Holston and Appadurai, 2003: 299).  
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